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This book, part of the Oxford Studies in Biolinguistic series, presents a state-of-
the-art overview of the field, more specifically, on psycho- and neurolinguistics 
and their relation to models of syntax, semantics, and morpho-phonology, while 
advancing its limits with cutting-edge research. A distinctive feature of the piece 
is the strong presence of interdisciplinary work and the internal coherence of the 
volume, integrating computational science, cognitive science, neurology and 
psycholinguistics, as well as syntax, semantics, and morpho-phonology; an 
integration that is most welcomed as it triggers debate and productive revisiting 
of the machinery assumed within all aforementioned sub-disciplines of 
linguistics. The volume is organized around the notion of garden path sentences, 
relative clauses, and their relations at the processing level; this includes major 
problems of natural language processing and the relations between syntax, 
semantics, and morpho-phonology from a more general point of view as well. 
 The editors have chosen to open the book with a reprinted article by 
Thomas Bever, from 1970 (which becomes a recurrent motif to which the 
contributors refer once and again as a departing point, thus giving structural and 
thematic unity and coherence to the book as a whole), a locus classicus for the 
psycholinguistic and neurocognitive approaches to ambiguity resolution, parsing 
(sentence perception, at the moment) strategies, and so-called ‘garden path 
sentences’ (GPS), the best known example being The horse raced past the barn fell, 
even if, as Tanenhaus claims in the Afterword, none of those is the prime theme 
of the work (but it is mostly about the relation between language and general 
cognitive strategies, an early plea for holism). The opening seems appropriate, 
since it provides the reader with an overall perspective on the studies of language 
as a concept analogous to those of “species or organ, as they are used in 
biological science” (p. 2). The article makes a case of distinguishing language as a 
mental/biological entity from language as a behavior; but, crucially, language 
structure and development are not to be isolated from the development of other 
cognitive capacities. Choosing this particular article is a statement in itself: 
Perceptual mechanisms, cognitive structures (including counting and number 
approximation, visual patterns and 2-D/3-D illusions), and linguistic structures 
(grammatical role assignment, abstraction of a structural pattern like ‘active’ or 
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morphological/syntactic ‘passive’), trying to abstract common cognitive routines 
(taking the term from computational science) and statistically valid parsing 
strategies (where one of the most important features of the article rely), are 
analyzed in their interactions and complexity, without limiting the scope to 
narrow linguistic mechanisms (cf. Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002 and their 
narrow concept of ‘syntax’), but adopting a holistic approach to cognition. The 
properties of perceptual systems affect language acquisition and, therefore, adult 
grammar. The other way around, once the neurophysiological substratum of 
perceptual/behavioral systems is found, the question to be asked is how that 
substratum organizes and computes information provided by perceptual 
systems, via different kind of ‘strategies’ involved in acquisition and maturation 
of mental organs. Such a perspective, I think, should be taken into account more 
often in current biolinguistic studies, particularly given the very active role the 
relations between language, cognition, and brain have in Bever’s piece (and 
throughout the volume).  
 The perspective put forth by Bever is reinforced and actualized in Chapter 
1, by Montserrat Sanz, Itziar Laka & Michael Tanenhaus. Of particular interest is 
the claim that, if some structures do not appear, it is due to the fact that they 
might not be learnable (p. 81), which sets a strong empirical challenge to be 
addressed in upcoming years (apart from the attention it has received since 
Bever’s foundational piece). The historical perspective adopted in this chapter 
(relating Bever’s research with previous experiments by Piaget on development 
and learning) is essential not only for non-linguists who might be venturing into 
the field from a Biolinguistic stance, but also for scholars working within the 
field, as the chapter helps situating historically, justifying methodologically, and 
demystifying some pervasive claims in the field. Developmental psychology, as 
well as cognitive science, is revealed as a foundational stone for linguistic 
theories of acquisition, and more recently language processing research, essenti-
ally focused on the computational and neurophysiological nature of parsing. 
Some of Bever’s strategies are summarized and discussed, and a partial classi-
ficatory typology is established. Within the limits of a book article, the piece 
provides a well-informed and wide historical scenario, including the aspects of 
past research that have had major impact on current research (including, but not 
limited to—and here lies one of the major contributions of the book in terms of 
wide potential readership—the Minimalist Program advanced over the past 20 
years by Noam Chomsky and related scholars).  
The book often looks back at itself and provides the reader with means to 
contextualize some specific papers (as is the case of chapters 8 and 12 with 
respect to the syntax–semantics interface), and the inclusion of opposing views is 
more than welcomed: For example, chapters 18 and 19 offer different inter-
pretations of neurocognitive evidence regarding the existence of a set of uniquely 
linguistic elements (a ‘Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense’ or FLN, in terms 
of Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002), ranging from a defense of FLN to the claim 
that FL does not contain unique elements that cannot be found in other cognitive 
domains. This self-referential nature, and the pervasive interconnectivity bet-
ween chapters is best explicated by a useful (although a bit confusing at first 
sight) diagram, which makes connections between chapters explicit, in terms of 
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themes and methodologies (p. 109). To the best of my knowledge, this is a rare 
feature in this kind of contributions to linguistic investigations, and I think the 
focus on such features should be encouraged regardless the personal opinion the 
reader might have with respect to the theory or theories entertained in each 
contribution. 
Gerry Altmann builds on Bever’s contributions in his 1970 paper in 
Chapter 2, while doing a review of the development of psycholinguistics from 
1980 to this day. Empirically, his focus is set on the interpretation of GPS like (1), 
mentioned above: 
 
(1) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
 
The parsing that takes [the horse raced past the barn] as the matrix clause is 
misleading, as the introduction of a finite V [fell] at the end of the sentence 
requires a complete change of perspective when assigning a structural 
representation to (1). The chapter describes with clarity the evolution of thinking 
about garden path and structural ambiguity resolution (of the ‘flying planes…’ 
kind), from focus on the process itself to research on the cognitive procedures 
before parsing. Bever’s contribution is taken as a departing point to discuss a 
number of approaches that emerged during the late ‘70s, and during the ‘80s and 
‘90s, including the author’s own research vinculating syntactic and semantic 
processing (as opposed to Bever’s dissociative view, p. 115) via linking rules. 
Interesting perspectives blurring the distinction between syntactic and semantic 
processing, as well as competence and performance, are introduced; although 
references might seem a bit outdated if the reader wants to follow up to the 
chapter. The discussion about connectionist networks and their mainly statistical 
approach to meaning (based on Elman’s work) in section 2.3 is clear and concise, 
but only one recent reference addressing the issue (Altmann & Mirkovic 2009) is 
mentioned, which I think is somehow anticlimactic. (The same actually occurs in 
subsequent sections: Relatively recent references are almost always limited to the 
author’s own works, the only exception being the reference to a special issue of 
Trends in Cognitive Science from 2010.) This chapter is eminently descriptive/ 
explicative (briefly introducing ideas and authors, and summarizing effectively 
three decades of psycholinguistic research while acknowledging the impact 
Bever’s work had on computational linguistics and neural network research), and 
does not engage on independent argumentation or raise new questions: Its place 
in the book seems to me to be well chosen (as an introductory chapter), but it 
might disappoint the reader looking for original research. 
 Chapter 3, by Maryellen McDonald, also stems from Bever’s considerations 
about garden path sentences, but confronting them with sentences like (2): 
 
(2) The boy that the girl likes hit the man. 
 
 Both GPS and sentences with relative clauses containing an overt C [that], 
like (2), have been addressed from psycholinguistic points of view. However, and 
this is one of McDonald’s points, seldom have they been discussed in a single 
piece, contrastively and comparatively. Like Lin in chapter 4, McDonald rejects 
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the proposal that GPS and complex, but unambiguous, sentences are processed 
under different assumptions: The goal is to bridge the division of the field of 
sentence comprehension by unifying those two apparently different kinds of 
processes. McDonald sheds light over Bever’s initial assumptions regarding a 
constraint-based system of ambiguity resolution, and relativizes the equation 
noun + verb = subject + verb by including not only syntactic patterns into 
account, but also lexical information and extra-linguistic resources (e.g., speaker 
identity, visual environment, etc.; p. 132). It is relevant to point out that the 
constraint-based approach has not been applied to relative clause interpretation 
(at least not widely), since they are traditionally believed to be unambiguous, and 
constraint-based systems have usually been associated to ambiguous sentences. 
Work in relative clause processing, summarized in chapter 4, has mostly 
appealed to a two-stage system, in which syntactic processing precedes semantic 
effects. Chapter 3 has as its goal to apply Bever’s general ideas, expressed 
through a constraint-based model, to object relative clauses (i.e., relative clauses 
in which the wh-operator is the object of the embedded V). The exposition takes 
into account computational limitations in human minds, as well as factors such as 
memory limitations and interference, when rejecting purely structural accounts 
(i.e., accounts based primarily on independent syntactic processing) in favor of a 
constraint-based system as a model for general comprehension, which implies a 
simpler and more coherent theory. The argument requires development of 
research of ambiguity within relative clauses, which is provided in a complete 
and clear subsection (pp. 135ff.), providing recent and relevant references to the 
interested reader. The discussion of the author’s own work towards integration 
of both phenomena (GPS and relative clause processing), as announced, takes 
into account the animacy feature of the relative clause’s antecedent as an import-
ant cue for interpretation, thus resorting to lexical/semantic factors as well as 
structural information (e.g., the antecedent is coindexed with the object of the 
relative clause). To complete the chapter, a discussion of production models is 
provided, with which the offered perspective is even wider, even if production is 
addressed almost exclusively from a statistical perspective which takes into 
account tendencies regarding animate and inanimate antecedents. The references 
in this section are mostly the authors’, and the paper concludes almost surpris-
ingly, with section 3.5. A conclusion section, summarizing the highlights of the 
piece, would have been welcomed. However, it does advance some lines of 
current and future research. 
 Chapter 4, by Chien-Jer Charles Lin, is intimately related to chapter 3, as it 
deals with relative clause processing. However, unlike chapter 3, it draws heavily 
on Chomskyan generative grammar, which leads to claims of the kind “they 
[relative clauses] demonstrate three critical formal properties of human language: 
recursivity, the existence of empty categories (e.g., traces), and constraints on 
dependencies related to those categories” (p. 142). These are problematic claims, 
insofar as no independent evidence is provided, nor are alternative accounts dis-
cussed. For example, there is a debate about the role of recursive procedures in 
natural language (which are obviously not the same as recursive functions as 
defined by Gödel 1931 [1986]) which the author overlooks; the same happens 
with the existence of empty categories in the sense of Chomsky (1981), namely 
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wh-trace, NP-trace, pro/PRO, which require a strong burden of independent 
proof (as it is possible to conceive internally coherent frameworks without the 
need to resort to traces/copies) and has been challenged from more than one 
front (e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff 2005). This is not to say that the author’s argu-
ments are to be rejected; it just means that the argumentation does not take into 
account alternative frameworks and is in this way limited. The discussion on 
relative clause processing relies crucially on the interpretation of gaps, and the es-
tablishment of filler–gaps dependencies. Notice that the notion of gap as presented 
by Mainstream Generative Grammar requires, as Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 
16) put it, ‘hidden levels of syntax’, related by means of structure mapping oper-
ations. In my opinion, no sufficient independent evidence is provided in this piece 
to accept that conclusion. The author proposes parallel syntactic and thematic 
(semantic) processing strategies (the latter comprising ‘templates’ which are 
activated automatically, in relation to Bever’s N + V = Subject + V procedure), but 
does not specify whether thematic information can be used by the syntactic 
parser and vice versa (cf. chapter 3), which is, I think, a gap in the argument. 
Moreover, both representations must match (p. 144), but no details are provided 
with respect to how exactly this process takes place. Multiple recent references 
are provided, and, should the reader accept the initial assumptions, the discus-
sion is internally coherent and consistent. My objection to the structure and 
content of this chapter stems precisely from the lack of justification for those 
initial assumptions, too strong to be taken for granted. Empirically, this chapter 
provides comparative evidence from English and Chinese, a most welcomed 
strategy, and processing asymmetries in production and comprehension of rela-
tive clauses are justified with this comparative evidence. Unfortunately, no future 
prospects are provided, and there is no independent conclusion section.  
 The next chapter focuses on English data, and relates to chapters 3 and 4 
insofar as its object of inquiry is the processing asymmetries of subject and object 
relative clauses, and complexity issues related to this processing. While not 
committing themselves to any particular theory of syntax (unlike the previous 
chapter), a substantial amount of literature is provided by the authors Edward 
Gibson, Harry Tily & Evelina Fedorenko in each point of the discussion, and 
cross-linguistic studies are also mentioned (although, as clearly stated in the 
chapter title, concrete cross-linguistic data is not discussed). The chapter is 
organized in three main parts, corresponding to three main theories about 
complexity issues arising in the processing of extraction effects: Section 5.2 is 
devoted to reanalysis theories, according to which an incorrect parsing (e.g., 
interpreting [raced] as the main V in (1), with [the horse] as its subject, following 
the N+V = Subject +V procedure) is to be somehow repaired (although no details 
is provided about how this is performed, even within the discussion section 5.5); 
section 5.2 discusses experience-/surprisal-based theories, according to which inter-
pretation is a statistical function of previous experience with similar input (e.g., 
more frequent words are easier to process), both at the word-level and the 
phrasal level. This section presents more discussion, and brief reports of different 
tendencies within the general approach, something that would have been 
desirable for reanalysis theories as well. Finally, memory-based theories take into 
account working memory capacity, and predict more complexity in ORC proces-
Biolinguistics  «  Reviews  « 146 
sing because they imply both more storage cost (maintaining a dependency active, 
as would be a relative operator and its associate base position) and more retrieval 
cost (retrieving word-meaning from LTM, for instance). Once again, a concise 
discussion about alternatives is provided, and in the last two sections the reader 
can find recent relevant references. Section 5.5 summarizes the predictions each 
group of theories would make, and provides evidence for each. The discussion is 
extremely neat and very well organized, the arguments can be followed with no 
difficulty, and for each empirical problem a substantial load of references is 
available. Section 5.6 problematizes the predictions made by each theory, with 
the interesting and thought provoking claim that no theory by itself can explain 
all considered phenomena; followed by section 5.7 in which two experiments 
including the relevant data, considering as a variable the possibility that a single 
NP can fulfill or not several grammatical functions with respect to the verbs, are 
carefully reported (including participants, methods, and results) and discussed 
from each viewpoint, spelling-out the predictions each theory makes applied to 
the experiment in question. The permanent discussion between theories and the 
specific predictions they make in different cases (with particular focus on 
variants of memory-based and experience-based theories) is one of the highlights 
of the chapter, and is very welcomed as a methodology for the presentation and 
contextualization of both the frameworks and the data. In the conclusion, 
prospects for the application of retrieval-based theories (a subtype of memory-
based theories) to languages with different basic word order than English (SVO), 
like Japanese, Korean, or Chinese are presented, and constitute a further 
challenge for the retrieval-based framework the authors mostly support, while 
always arguing convincingly and with various sources in favor of mixed 
approaches and not relying on a single mechanism to explain such a complex 
phenomenon as RC interpretation.   
 Chapter 6 is built upon the concept of psycholinguistic chain (P-chain), which 
relates production, prediction (error), and (consequent) acquisition in a novel 
form, with modifications presented in the chapter. The first approximation to the 
P-chain would be as follows (p. 175): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Psycholinguistic chain 
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 The authors (Gary Dell & Audrey Kittredge) argue their way through the 
P-chain in a clear and concise manner, providing theoretical and experimental 
support for their claims, and relating language with other cognitive capacities 
(e.g., eye-tracking), as well as stressing the mutual relation between processing 
and production, as well as implicit learning and prediction (as loops in the 
chain), making the model more dynamic and powerful. Section 6.2 is devoted to 
full explication and argumentation of the claims involved in the P-chain 
framework, dedicating particular subsections to each of the ‘links’ so that the 
reader can have a general idea of what the framework is about, and how it 
impacts on empirical research. The framework is contextualized historically (in 
relation to previous theories) as well as epistemologically (in relation to contem-
porary alternatives), which is a great help for readers with a limited background 
on psycholinguistics and its development. The chapter presents a most interest-
ing view of acquisition, in which partial errors in structural/lexical prediction 
lead to changes in the linguistic system (a perspective that is perfectly compatible 
with recent advances in complexity theory and language as a complex system), 
resulting in the readjustment of the system (acquisition). Overtly independent of 
syntactic frameworks like Generative Grammar, the article assumes the existence 
of “an ‘innate’ architecture that has the ability to learn sequences and to represent 
meaning” (p. 179), which, exposed to input (sentences, their meaning being 
inferred from the context), corrects activation weights in neural networks and the 
system thus acquires a structure and its meaning, based on a ‘trial and error’ 
basis. While objectionable (particularly from the viewpoints of formal syntax and 
semantics, as the computational/neurocognitive nature of syntactic structure is 
not made explicit), the framework is a dynamic attempt to coherently relate three 
essential processes in language use, external or not. It is to be noticed that the 
case study presented by the authors involves phonotactic learning, which does 
not have the articulated structure that is currently theorized for syntactic repre-
sentations or semantic structures. It should be a challenge (and a desirable and 
exciting development) for the P-chain theory presented here to try to accom-
modate the RRCC data presented in previous chapters and the acquisition of 
discontinuous Operator-Variable syntactic dependencies, to give some examples. 
 Chapter 7 gets back to Bever’s article as a foundational stone for many 
issues of present relevance for psycholinguistics. David Townsend focuses on 
four claims deeply related to Bever’s paper (in fact, reformulations of Bever’s 
strategies) and provides theoretical and empirical support for them (p. 184): 
 
    • Comprehenders form linguistic structures. 
    • Linguistic elements project structure. 
    • Common representations interact. 
    • Grammar checks the adequacy of projected structures. 
 
 Given the strength of some of those claims and/or the theoretical and 
empirical consequences they have, it would have been nice to define some key 
concepts, like ‘structure formation’ or ‘projection’, of crucial relevance in current 
theoretical linguistics, particularly within generative grammar (from which the 
author takes concepts, like ‘traces’ in p. 191).  
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 The author compares and confronts the program advanced by Bever with 
previous theories (e.g., Derivational Theory of Complexity), providing evidence 
in favor of the former. Each of the claims above is expanded on in its own section, 
which also features Bever’s original interpretative strategies for reference and 
clarification. Garden path effects are compared with other kinds of parsing ambi-
guities (e.g., homonymy), and argument alternations (e.g., The dancer tripped 
John/The dancer tripped), which also affect the assignment of a structural 
description to a certain string. The author introduces concepts about verb seman-
tics (like ‘bounded verbs’) and the requirements they establish for co-occurring 
arguments which are not formalized or made totally explicit, however, the argu-
mentation can be followed without problems. Section 7.4 clarifies the somehow 
obscure sentential ‘common representations interact’, by making a case for the 
interaction of syntax and semantics, and how comprehension makes use of struc-
tural and semantic information simultaneously, while comparing and contrasting 
competing theories with experimental basis (although little independent evi-
dence is mentioned at this point). Section 7.5 explores the means by which gram-
mar and meaning interact via patterns that provide provisory semantic represen-
tations to be refined in real time, although no clear definition of what ‘grammar’ 
comprises is given (sometimes it seems to be used as a synonym of ‘syntax’, but 
that is not clarified). The section is carefully argued, and extends on the mecha-
nisms via which comprehenders anticipate meaning and structure in terms of 
conceptual and/or linguistic representations. 
 Chapter 8, by Robert Berwick, is more narrowly linguistically oriented. 
Taking as a ‘cornerstone’ of Bever’s seminal article to highlight Chomsky’s (1986) 
distinction between knowledge of language and use of that knowledge, the author 
attempts to provide a synthesis between internalist and externalist models of 
language. External modeling is identified with statistical methods in corpus 
linguistics (and part of computational linguistics as well, including insights from 
information theory), having as its aim to be able to predict the next element to 
appear in a string, in turn assuming a certain model of comprehension based on 
memory-retrieval, as we saw above. Internal modeling (which the author 
identifies with Chomskyan generative linguistics, which is a perspective I find 
quite limited, given the amount and quality of alternative formal internalist 
approaches), on the contrary, focuses on simplicity at the time of formulating 
generalizations about the mentally represented knowledge a speaker has in its 
mind-brain. The author proceeds to discuss formal grammars in section 8.4, 
assuming that the subset relations expressed in the so-called Chomsky hierarchy 
hold (but see Krivochen 2014 for a critique of such a claim both theoretically and 
empirically grounded). The argument expands on that made in Chomsky (1957) 
about the inadequacy of Markov models to account for linguistic structure, as 
they are based on linear relations (a claim which has to be, at best, relativized to 
portions of natural language grammars, as I show in Krivochen 2014), which is 
useful for the reader more familiar with neurolinguistic literature than with the 
foundational texts of generative transformational grammar, but adds little if 
anything to the discussion about the adequacy of certain formal grammars to 
generate structural descriptions for natural languages or particular segments of 
them. A main concern of the author seems to be to establish a comparison pro-
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cedure for grammars, understood as sets of (generative + transformational) rules, 
which favors phrase structure grammars (a claim traceable back to Chomsky’s 
early writings). The author points to an apparent tension between statistical 
methods and linguistic description, given by the fact that constituency tests do 
not always coincide with statistical preferences (p. 201), such that, for instance, 
the syntactic constituents [VP walk [PP on ice]] are differently chunked when it 
comes to statistical prediction, and the P [on] is more likely to appear with [walk] 
that [walk on] is to appear with [ice]. The proposed solution is highly theory-
dependent, and consists on substituting a standard phrase structure grammar 
with Bare Phrase Structure (BPS), in which there are no labels (for details, see 
Chomsky 1995). However conceptually appealing the proposal might seem, there 
are to the best of my knowledge no neurocognitive accounts that support such 
theory, what is more, performance compatible models (e.g., Sag & Wasow 2011) 
provide more explicit accounts of the apparent tension between knowledge and 
use than the alternative proposed here, strictly tied to the Minimalist Program. 
Weakening the conditions for predictive models is not, in my opinion, an advis-
able methodological step. The announced synthesis consists on taking BPS as 
higher-level instructions that generate particular instructions (knowledge put to 
use), appealing to the (digital) computer analogy, and acknowledging the 
combination of different information sources (a recurrent motif throughout the 
volume). In spite of the multiple theoretical biases we find here when it comes to 
internalist linguistics, the argumentation is clean and neat, and the reader who is 
not familiar with the field of formal grammars will find a nice introduction to 
some old but still relevant arguments. 
 Connected with the linguistic concerns of chapter 8, Chapter 9 also intro-
duces the discussion of Center-Embedded Clauses (CEC) within the framework 
of Chomsky’s version of the Minimalist Program. Janet Fodor links Bever’s 
strategies (which are not language-specific) to the (methodological) desire to 
minimize the specificity of the Language Faculty and allocate as many properties 
of language as possible in other cognitive systems, so-called ‘external systems’. 
CEC present discontinuous dependency patterns like (3): 
 
(3) The dog the cat the fox was chasing was scratching was yelping. 
(Bever 1970: 334) 
    
 Fodor presents recursion and movement (transformational rules) as two 
facts about human language, for the second time in the volume (cf. chapter 4), 
thus restricting her theoretical framework (and the syntactic representations she 
uses) to Minimalism (without acknowledging much discussion about the nature 
and properties of recursion, including problems concerning its very definition). 
She describes CECs as particularly difficult to parse while not presenting differ-
ences with other kinds of clauses in terms of multiple embedding or movement 
rules. In opposition to previous accounts based on structural subjacency, Fodor 
reformulates Bever’s Strategy J, regarding the relative roles of NPs in NP, NP, …, 
V configurations and the assignment of grammatical functions within their 
respective clauses. She holds the threshold of two levels of embedding as provid-
ing particular processing problems, while deriving it from the syntax–prosody 
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interface. Her account relates the assignment of structural descriptions to units 
based on the prosodic contour of local units, in turn relying on the idea of local 
phonological cycles and the necessity to wipe the working memory clean of 
structure as soon as possible, several times during a derivation. Fodor provides 
cross-linguistic variation patterns of RC attachment preferences, based on deri-
vational chunks (‘packages’, similar in spirit to Chomskyan phases but psycho-
linguistically supported) and the difficulty of the parser ‘looking into’ an already 
finished package, which is subjected to interpretation as a unit. The packaging 
mechanism would not be directly derived from memory issues, but from 
prosodic patterns (which are present even in silent read, the so-called ‘Implicit 
Prosody Hypothesis’), thus cross-linguistic variation can be accounted for 
without the need to suggest different speakers of different languages have 
different working memory capacities. The article has important consequences for 
the theory of phases and syntactic locality in general, although a discussion of the 
implications this theory has for semantic cycles would be necessary in order to 
implement the model within a wider program. The author integrates phono-
logical and lexical information, but it is not clear whether the packaging occurs 
on the meaning side as well as on the sound side, an interesting challenge for the 
theory presented here to address. The prosodic interface and inner structure of 
intonational phrases are however described with great detail, and even if a one-
sided (i.e., taking into account only the sound interface) explanation of the 
phenomena involved does not seem plausible to me, the evidence is carefully 
presented and the arguments follow from the initial claims with no gaps, should 
one accept the path taken by Fodor. The author herself provides a discussion of 
non-prosodic explanations in section 9.5, focused on syntactic accounts mainly 
worried about structural distance between dependent constituents for memory 
reasons (which do not coincide with the “distances that matter for prosodic 
parsing”, p. 228), and giving arguments in favor of the superiority of the prosodic 
account in terms of predictions. In relation to the previous chapter, a mention of 
Markov models for phonological structure would have been a nice link (as there 
is a mention of ‘flattening’ structure at the syntax-phonology interface, p. 217), 
but it is a task left for the reader to undertake. 
 Chapter 10 takes the reader back to neurocognitive issues, drifting away 
from generative linguistics. Brian McElree & Lisbeth Dyer focus on the role of 
working memory in deriving linguistic expressions in real time (a topic explicitly 
left aside in generative grammar), and how linguistic processing is limited by 
non-language-specific constrains on the amount of structure that can be pro-
cessed at any given time. The authors, advancing Bever’s (1970) inquiries on the 
role of memory representations during comprehension, its nature, and the factors 
determining the success or failure of memory-involving processes; provide a 
much needed gap-filling, since there has been surprisingly little research on 
working memory and its relation to real-time language processing, particularly 
when facing long-distance dependencies between constituents. The authors 
review previous theories, problematizing tricky notions like ‘processing complex-
ity’ (which are taken for granted in many narrow-syntactic works) and critically 
evaluating their impact on different accounts of memory-limitations approaches 
to comprehension, impairments (e.g., as result of brain injuries), and reduced 
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processing capacities, providing the reader with a fair amount of relevant 
bibliography on each section. The very notion of working memory as opposed to 
a retrieval-only Long Term Memory (LTM) is challenged, insofar as empirical 
evidence has not been conclusive enough to postulate two separate systems, and 
a more dynamic system is argued for, in which WM does not have a fixed 
capacity (cf. Miller’s ‘plus-minus seven units’), and information retrieval does not 
seem to be privileged or faster for elements predicted to be in the WM with 
respect to elements predicted to be in LTM. Therefore, a fixed approach to WM is 
inadequate, the authors claim, and a dynamic real-time approach is necessary to 
account for comprehension phenomena. Section 10.3 is devoted to information 
retrieval in language comprehension, comparing predictions about the respective 
roles of WM and LTM with exemplified experiments (only essential details and 
general discussion). Retrieval models are relevant insofar as cue-driven retrieval 
can account for both rapid access to information as well as failure to pick the 
relevant piece of data out (importantly, this is not limited to language, but 
applies to “any complex cognitive skill”, p. 238), if the cue does not point towards 
the required information with enough specificity, what is called ‘retrieval inter-
ference’, there being the possibility of overlapping between cues. This model can 
provide the flexibility that fixed WM accounts lack, and the authors carefully 
argue their point. The claims about memory and retrieval possibilities are ade-
quately exemplified, with clear cases and a concise account of each, without 
adhering to any particular grammatical formalism (which is a positive note, inso-
far as the reader can translate the results to the framework of his preference). The 
reader is lead through the discussion gently, with numerous and recent biblio-
graphical sources.   
 The next chapter, by Ina Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Mathias Schlesewsky, 
touches on a crucial point for both grammatical theories (including syntax, 
semantics, and morpho-phonology) and neurocognitive approaches to language: 
the role and identity of universals. The authors begin with an overview of the 
concept, and the (relative) dissociation between linguistic universals and cogni-
tive universals (already drawn by Bever), as well as the present difficulty of 
finding real universals, particularly after the tremendous growth of typological 
studies, which often force theoreticians to relativize universals into tendencies. 
The authors’ goal is to combine neurocognitive research with linguistic typology, 
in so-called ‘neurotypology’, a most interesting aim and certainly welcomed gap 
filling in (non-UG-driven) research on universals. The enterprise is based on a 
dynamic approach to the relations between language, brain organization, and 
(general principles of) cognition. Specific linguistic characteristics would be given 
by a direct relation between properties of the brain and properties of language, 
without mediation by cognition. The authors discuss a number of related 
proposals which address topics underlying the aforementioned tripartite relation 
in section 11.2; and address the issue of inter-linguistic variation in section 11.3, 
providing evidence of different neurological responses to form-meaning conflicts 
in different languages, supported with a good deal of references and brief, but 
effective, experiment reporting. This section makes a point of qualitative inter-
linguistic variation from a neurological point of view, which the authors attempt 
to derive within a framework based on Bever’s strategies, particularly the NP–V–
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NP pattern as actor–process–undergoer, and the properties of a given language in 
terms of cognitive categorization and decision-making. The notion of ‘cue’, which 
has already appeared in the volume, is of key relevance here, as languages seem 
to rely of different cues when assigning semantic roles to arguments in a 
syntactic construal (p. 247). In spite of differences, it seems that the cognitive 
system prefers prototypical actors and actor-initial argument orders, in order to 
identify roles as quickly and effectively as possible, a conclusion supported by 
inter-linguistic electrophysiological studies involving languages belonging to 
different families (Germanic, Altaic, Romance) and typologies (accusative vs. 
ergative languages). Asymmetries between actors and undergoers (patients–
themes in theta-theoretical terms) are also attested, always providing neuro-
physiological evidence (which considerably strengthens the argument), which 
the authors interpret as a ‘competence’ for the actor role (p. 249), depending on 
the prototypicality (animate, human, definite, nominative/absolutive) of the 
competing arguments, a competence which does not arise for other argument 
roles. This competition, the authors claim, is a plausible universal of linguistic 
processing (which is not to be confused with a proper linguistic universal of the 
kind advocated for in UG-based proposals or even Greenberg-type universals). 
The authors introduce the category of ‘neural attractor’ for the actor role, insofar 
as it is that role which triggers the competence between arguments in processing. 
Moreover, this competence could be modeled by means of attractor networks, 
which is in itself an exciting empirical challenge for the neurotypological 
enterprise (and its collaboration with related disciplines, particularly 
mathematical modeling of complex systems) in future years. 
 Chapter 12 focuses on the syntax-semantics interface (arguably, a topic also 
present in chapter 11, taking into account its concern for role assignment in 
processing), and the respective takes of formal syntax (assuming the Minimalist 
Program, in detriment of alternatives which are not even mentioned) and psycho-
linguistics. Montserrat Sanz provides a useful racconto of the takes on thematic 
structure from GB to Minimalism, and problematizes the mapping between 
semantic construal (in which notions like ‘event’ are core) and syntactic construal 
(which works with formal, semantic, and phonological features, in the theory 
assumed by the author). Sanz claims that linguistics deals with competence, 
whereas psycholinguistics deals with performance, a claim that leads to justifying 
Chomsky’s seminal distinction. However, the distinction has blurred in several 
occasions, and unifying theories have been proposed (some in this very same 
volume, but see also Sag & Wasow 2011 for an alternative outside transform-
ational generative grammar), whose discussion would have been welcomed. The 
author’s take on the syntax-semantics interface is heavily influenced by the 
strong role features play in the Minimalist program, and parsing is also tackled 
from this stance. This perspective, while not extent of problems (particularly 
given the difficulty of assigning neurocognitive reality to formal features, which 
are at the very core of Minimalism), is novel and therefore welcomed; and 
whereas the concept the author has about what constitutes the syntax-semantics 
interface can be discussed, it is a pushing-forward development of the initial 
Minimalist desire to explain properties of language in terms of output conditions 
established by the C-I and S-M interface systems. Moreover, it critically discusses 
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both exclusively syntactic and exclusively semantic attempts at explaining the 
parsing difficulties of GPS, which strengthens the interface approach to linguistic 
phenomena. Assuming the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995 et seq.), then, the 
article is not only reader-friendly and well-grounded, but also provocative (at 
least for the most orthodox takes on the role of the interfaces in parsing). The 
author is very careful in including multiple factors into account (e.g., Aktionsart, 
lexical syntax/semantics, verb typology, etc.) when arguing in favor of a parti-
cular take on GPS processing, and provides relevant references for each factor. 
Considering these variables, Sanz argues that there is a gradient of difficulty for 
GPS processing, which is more easily accounted for assuming aspects of lexical 
semantics and compositional properties of the Verb Phrase and the event it 
denotes (including Aktionsart) than ignoring those factors. The discussion turns 
highly technical when the author considers the possibility of including an Event 
Phrase as a functional projection in the syntactic construal, whose interpretable 
features are read off at the semantic component. The author claims that thematic 
roles are parsing necessities, not grammatical necessities (contra those approaches 
within Minimalism, like Hornstein 2003, that consider theta roles as features to be 
checked before the derivation reaches the interfaces): This claim has potentially 
interesting consequences not only at the empirical level, but also when consider-
ing the ‘design’ problem for the Faculty of Language (for those approaches that 
assume such a notion). Within the theoretical limits imposed by the Minimalist 
Program, Sanz makes a valuable contribution, and advances the ground in rele-
vant and little explored aspects of the (lexicon-)syntax-semantics interface(s). 
 Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini tackles the issue of Platonistic vs. Cartesian 
approaches to language, which has been the topic of recent debate (see, e.g., 
Watumull 2013 for an attempt of unification, and Behme 2014 or Krivochen 2013 
for a critical view and extended discussion). The main issue is whether linguistic 
objects can be abstract and biological or not, and the ontology of derivations and 
the generative system in each case. Piattelli-Palmarini makes an assessment of the 
role of abstraction in linguistic theory, clearly aligned with the Chomskyan view 
that there is no ‘knowledge of language’, as ‘language’ itself is the knowledge a 
speaker has in its mind-brain, UG and the grammar of a particular language (p. 
264). The article is clear and well-organized, although key notions are left 
undefined (as in most of the papers constituting the realist-conceptualist debate), 
‘abstract object’ being perhaps the most important. The author argues his point 
with empirical evidence regarding so-called ‘conservativity’, a set-theoretical 
property according to which A ⋂ B = (A⋂B) ⋂ A. This is particularly revealing of 
the framework he assumes, since the Minimalist generative operation Merge 
forms sets (Shieber’s 1986 Unification also works with sets, but the resulting 
object is not characterized as identical to either of the terms involved in the 
operation, but as the union of the feature matrices involved). This property is 
said to hold for determiners (a linguistic label) in all natural languages (references 
are provided for this claim, but only few examples outside English are analyzed), 
however, the examples actually involve existential and universal quantifiers and 
their logical properties, p. 266 (regardless their materialization, namely morpho-
phonological form, this is an important distinction). Piattelli-Palmarini compares 
English determiner ‘the’ and its properties with imaginary determiners for which 
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the property of ‘conservativity’ does not hold, and claims that non-conservative 
determiners would invert the logical properties of the word class as a two-place 
predicate. In my opinion, there is a mix between linguistic and logical properties 
of determiners (a trend traceable back to Russell 1905), which makes the 
discussion a bit hard to follow if one distinguishes logics from (formal) grammars 
of natural languages. It is also not clear whether the property arises at the seman-
tic interface or is relevant in the so-called ‘narrow syntax’, although the second 
option is hinted at—insofar as feature checking considerations are mentioned, 
but the exact locus of conservativity relevance is not formulated explicitly: The 
mention of ‘syntactico-semantic structures’ (p. 268) does not clarify the matter, as 
‘semantic structures’ is left undefined. After the consideration of the examples, 
and discussion from a Minimalist stance, section 13.3 dwells with the status of 
this ‘universal’, and goes back to the initially mentioned debate between realism 
and conceptualism: The author’s hypothesis is that the universal follows from a 
property of the Language Faculty, even if the motivation for this property is 
“outside the domain of linguistics” (p. 270), which is at least an anticlimactic 
claim: Why should it be outside the boundaries of linguistic inquiry, particularly 
considering the ‘biolinguistic enterprise’? Sections 13.4 and 13.5 (the latter, a con-
clusion) focus on the properties of ‘abstraction’ as a cognitive operation, but the 
exact nature of ‘abstract objects’, central to the realist-conceptualist debate, is 
never clarified. Nor is the highly problematic notion of ‘virtual conceptual neces-
sity’, introduced at the very end (p. 271). The article is reader-friendly, parti-
cularly for those who are familiar with the assumptions and axioms of the Mini-
malist program, but is very likely to leave other readers asking questions about 
the overt and covert assumptions that guide and underlie the argumentation. 
 Chapter 14 follows on the topic of determiners and their role in the core 
syntax, but from an empirical stance, which is most welcomed. Methodologically, 
Virginia Valian chooses to begin by justifying her selection of determiners as the 
object of study, which is a rare and welcomed feature in innateness-related 
studies. Moreover, the author (briefly) addresses the issue of what is innate and 
what is learned/acquired, again a point in favor of the methodology followed in 
this article. The author’s concern to make her assumptions fully explicit before 
entering data discussion (limited by space reasons) is ostensive and clarifying. 
The study includes careful analysis of determiner acquisition timing: Experi-
ments, rather than being fully explained including methods, participants, and 
results followed by discussion, are directly discussed, even though relevant 
results are incorporated in tables. Empirical predictions stemming from the claim 
that schematic representations of determiners are innate are spelled out, and they 
involve continuity on the developmental trajectory (p. 276). Evidence in favor of 
a continuity approach is provided, including the crucial notion of under-
specification and its role in acquiring the relevant elements; as well as equivalence 
classes (how the class of ‘determiners’ is abstracted from the data, and, converse-
ly, how elements in speech stream are assigned a class). After discussing what 
the author hypothesizes to be innate, and providing experimental evidence in 
favor of her hypothesis; she proceeds to discuss what is left to be learnt in section 
14.5. Three factors are identified here: prosodic templates, knowledge of specific 
lexical items, and controlled processing including several sources of information. 
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These factors are succinctly explained, and it would have helped the reader to 
have a separate conclusion summarizing the main points of the piece, as well as 
including future prospects and empirical challenges. The article is nevertheless a 
valuable piece, as it relies on experimental data to make assertions, and predic-
tions are clearly spelled out, which makes them falsifiable and thus scientifically 
interesting.  
 In Chapter 15, Simona Mancini, Nicola Molinaro & Manuel Carreiras 
analyze the concept of morphological agreement, from the perspective of the 
Minimalist program, in which feature agreement triggers operations like Move 
and even, in some versions of the theory, Merge (e.g., Wurmbrand 2014). Despite 
considering features (of the kind [value, Dimension], as in [Past Tense]) “the basic 
building blocks of a derivation” (p. 282) as in orthodox versions of Minimalism (a 
claim shared with models like HPSG and LFG) but an assumption that has not 
remained unchallenged (e.g., by Cognitive Grammar, Construction Grammar, 
and the like), the authors provide a novel perspective over so-called φ-features, a 
bundle including person, number, and gender, from a psycholinguistic stance. The 
thesis is that, since there are differences in the processing of each kind of 
information, those features should not be treated as a single unit. The authors 
distinguish between morphosyntactic information conveyed by a feature (φ-
value) and the semantic-pragmatic information concerning the denotatum (σ-
value). That is an interesting distinction insofar as φ-features are traditionally 
thought to be uninterpretable by LF, and the notion of σ-value makes a point of 
the semantic relevance of those features, at the cost of introducing yet another 
distinction in a theory that is already quite far from ‘minimalist’. The discussion 
is clear, and examples are clarifying, particularly given the fact that new notions 
are introduced, like σ-value or ‘interpretative anchor’ of a feature (its σ-value). 
Theoretically, there is a further complication represented by matching operations 
between both sets of values, but if the enterprise pays off empirically, the 
complication will have been justified. The article does not present so detailed an 
analysis that we can be certain of this, but it is a challenge to be addressed in 
future research. However, section 15.3 tests the validity of the approach against 
psycholinguistic evidence, including ERP patterns for some of the Spanish 
examples cited, which reinforces the point, as well as analyses of N–A and V–N 
agreement patterns, including acceptable morphological mismatches and their 
subsequent explanation in terms of the model presented here, both theoretically 
and via psycholinguistic evidence in processing. It is not clear that the data 
cannot be accounted for via different agreement patterns, as the alternative is not 
considered (which opens the door for future simplifications of the theory), but 
the level of descriptive adequacy is reached, and, should one adhere to feature-
driven operations in the syntax, so is explanatory adequacy. A point in favor of 
the article is that there are comparisons drawn between what would be expected 
in mainstream models of comprehension (involving φ-features as a single 
bundle) and the ‘anchor’ model presented in the article, which helps situating the 
proposal within the field, in relation to alternatives. The dissociation between φ- 
and σ- values allow the authors to explain qualitatively different patterns in 
neurocognitive studies between person mismatches and number mismatches, 
which advances the ground with respect to orthodox agreement research. The 
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notion of σ-values and anchors could have been developed further, and future 
prospects for the theory could as well have been given, but the perspective of the 
piece is overall interesting and novel within Minimalist assumptions.  
 Colin Phillips, in Chapter 16, revisits Bever’s parsing model, in which an 
initial hypothesis about meaning is the result of a ‘quick and dirty parsing’, to be 
later on replaced by the definitive representation of the linguistic expression’s 
meaning. The article critically reviews the relation between mental grammars 
and parsing, as well as the psychological reality of grammatical representations, 
and the historical relations between generative transformational grammars and 
psycholinguistics, focusing on the problems the transformational component 
brought about for psycholinguistics given the uncertain psychological status of 
transformational rules. Early empirical research seemed to support the general 
view about a generative component, but the conclusions were at best elusive 
when considering transformations (e.g., the impossibility of ‘reversing’ a trans-
formation). The historical review is helpful for the reader, insofar as it presents 
hypotheses and experiments carried out in the early days of generative linguistics 
in a concise and clear manner, as well as the theoretical and empirical challenges 
the data imposed to transformational models. The author also addresses the diffi-
culties presented by the Derivational Theory of Complexity, and the necessity to 
critically revisit the basic ideas the DTC presented and are nowadays still in use. 
Phillips considers, as empirical points the incremental character of linguistic 
parsing, which is incompatible with Standard Theory’s rewriting rules (based on 
L-grammars), and the problems posited by sentences which had apparently 
undergone a transformation, whose interpretation required additional stipu-
lations in the psycholinguistic side in order to comply with the model of the 
grammar. Section 16.4 is focused on discussing Bever’s ‘double interpretation’ 
model and plausibility-based strategies, suggesting that comprehenders build 
fully-fledged representations for sentences (p. 306), a claim that is not 
incompatible with probabilistic heuristics. Phillips’ discussion includes numerous 
references to experiments succinctly described, as well as bibliographical refer-
ences which are of much use for the reader to have direct access to primary 
sources of the cases reported. It is to be highlighted that potential objections and 
counter-arguments (often related to Bever’s account and similar purposes) are 
considered and properly addressed by Phillips, which makes the point stronger 
and also leads the reader gently into the conclusions. The article makes a point of 
the necessity of looking for more than one way to account for processing pheno-
mena, suggesting alternatives and considering (within reasonable space limits) 
the theoretical and empirical implications of each possibility (section 16.7 and the 
revision of Townsend & Bever’s ‘analysis by synthesis’ is a fine example of this 
tendency). While acknowledging the importance of Bever’s research for the inter-
action between grammar and psycholinguistics, Phillips presents a critical pano-
rama and points towards several possibilities for future prospects.  
 Edward Stabler analyzes the relation between language and cognition from 
a computational perspective in Chapter 17. The author problematizes accounting 
for linguistic variation, the lack of consensus upon basic theoretical notions (both 
major issues in current formal linguistics), and the identification of psychological 
processes involved in linguistic parsing in section 17.1, which helps situating the 
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problematic interplay of computational linguistics and psycholinguistics in con-
text. Section 17.2 presents some basic notions about which there is, apparently, 
more consensus than often acknowledged, although oversimplifying some issues: 
While Joshi’s (1985) claim that natural languages are mildly context-sensitive is 
indeed widely accepted (p. 318), it is also to be noticed that there has been 
research on the Markov nature of morphophonology from the 80’s onwards, as 
well as higher-level, Turing computable models for linguistic theory (see, e.g., 
Watumull 2012). Therefore, his subset relations between formal grammars, 
centered on Minimalist Grammars as defined by Stabler (1997) and Michaelis 
(2001) leaves aside many important and relevant issues both computational (e.g., 
the alternative models that have been developed beyond Minimalist Grammars, 
including Unification-based grammars, to give but one example) and empirical 
(their descriptive/explanatory adequacy). The author centers his attention on 
Context-Sensitive Minimalist Grammars (CSMG), including a transformational 
component (as he formalizes the notion of movement in a Minimalist tree, p. 
321). All theoretical biases notwithstanding, Stabler attempts to unify formalisms 
in order to address fundamental issues arising in various versions of the Mini-
malist Program (like the existence of traces and multidominance alternatives, and 
the computational nature of Merge, as well as learning methods). Section 17.3 
proceeds to briefly discuss the relation between CSMG and psycholinguistic 
research, departing from Bever’s work, and including automata theory. Stabler 
argues in favor of the existence of computational universals, which he opposes to 
‘concrete universals’, an interesting distinction particularly considering the con-
tent of chapters 11 and 13; it might be interesting for the reader to see if the ‘con-
servativity’ property Piattelli-Palmarini proposes as a universal holds, and how if 
so, in a CSMG. Unfortunately, the distinction is not developed to its full extent, 
no examples are provided (this holds all throughout the article), and the chapter 
ends quite abruptly. It does, however, provide some future challenges to be ad-
dressed from a computational perspective for linguistics and psycholinguistics. 
 Chapter 18, by Luciano Fadiga & Alessandro D’Ausilio, focuses on the 
relation between ‘action’ (so-called ‘motor system’, although it is clarified that 
more than a single area of the brain) and language, digging into the problem of 
how several processes are temporary organized, and how ‘actions’ obey an end, 
related to the issue of problem-solving. The issue is relevant for language insofar 
as there are common characteristics found in problem-solving and language 
structure, like recursivity (with due distinctions between nested structures and 
strict sequentiality, the latter of which is problematic), which is not technically 
defined, but in this paper seems to be synonymous with ‘hierarchy’ (even though 
it is not the case that all definitions of recursive functions would be compatible 
with this approach, particularly given the fact that we can have hierarchy 
without recursion, in a non-trivial sense, if recursion comprehends [X…[X…]] 
structures and we operate only with hierarchy without center embedding, 
appealing to monotonic applications of a generative function). This relevance is 
somehow difficult to see in the first sections of the chapter, devoted almost 
entirely to the motor systems, their functioning, and comparison with other 
systems (like the visual system). The properties of neural networks on which the 
motor systems depend are also explained, with references where applicable. Only 
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in section 18.3, devoted to Broca’s area, can the reader begin to establish a 
relation with human language, given the key importance of this area in language 
processing, and in section 18.4 the relevance of the previous discussion is spelled 
out. It would have helped the reader if this relevance had at least been hinted at 
in the introduction, or a small summary of the content of each subsection had 
been provided, so that the reader can prepare to grasp the major points of each 
section and connect them all in 18.4. Discussion in this section is mainly specu-
lative (e.g., regarding the common origin of language semantics and syntax and 
the motor systems, a claim that the authors themselves recognize not verifiable), 
and to some extent also vague. After what seems too long an introduction, more 
concrete connections with observable aspects of language behavior or careful 
consideration of language structure would have been expected. However, the 
only key concept linking both domains, hierarchy, is not technically and unambi-
guously defined, which seriously undermines the discussion, particularly for 
formal and computational linguists. 
 The issue of modular vs. holistic models of the mind is the object of 
Chapter 19, by Josef Grodzinsky, who makes an introductory history of the 
debate (going back to Broca’s 1861 influential paper in favor of localization, and 
the holistic reactions it generated), easy to follow and full of relevant references 
for the interested reader. Within the context of this debate, Bever’s position is 
identified with a form of holism, as he attempted to derive linguistic generali-
zations from more general cognitive principles. Grodzinsky, on the other hand, 
stems from Fodor’s work on modularity in order to establish four clear delimi-
tation criteria, which are used to discuss literature holding the claim that lang-
uage is not modular, exemplified by the so-called ‘mirror neuron theory’, and 
exactly why and how it is insufficient to account for a number of theoretical and 
empirical problems. As it is essential for the following argument, the case for 
modular models of the mind is presented in a very neat and clear way, and all 
throughout the chapter, several perspectives are discussed (neurocognitive, com-
putational, psycholinguistic, and syntactic) and illustrated by means of reported 
experiments (focusing on different interpretations of the set of data obtained by 
Fazio et. al.) and, where relevant, concrete linguistic examples (involving relative 
clauses and quantifier scope, which is an interesting link with the content of 
chapters 3, 4, and 5). The author considers several possible counterexamples to 
the modular theory seriously and in detail, which is a feature to highlight in this 
article. Neurocognitive evidence is focused on the specific—modular—role of 
Broca’s area in language, and whereas its role can be subsumed to more general 
cognitive principles or not: Experiment report is once again crucial and it is 
carried out with the utmost care. The author concludes that Broca aphasia is not 
directly connected to deficits in sequencing, embedding, or action theory (cf. 
chapter 18), and even considers (although very firefly) cross-linguistic evidence. 
A clear perspective of what the Broca’s area does and does not do emerges clearly 
by the end of the chapter, and, despite the reader’s own position, the discussion 
is logically consistent and carefully presented, deserving close scrutiny.  
 Chapter 20 addresses language acquisition, reporting studies with neonates 
and very young infants. Jacques Mehler builds on Bever’s work on cognitive 
strategies, and suggests that language learning (along with other human-specific 
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cognitive abilities) should be studied before comparing capacities shared with 
other species. The paper is devoted to discussing breakthroughs in language 
acquisition research, from Bever’s seminal work to current studies on the relation 
between frequency and abstraction of word order patterns in pre-lexical infants 
(thus making it a useful reference piece). Discussion in this chapter is centered on 
phonology, both segmental and suprasegmental, and how it affected theoretical 
accounts of acquisition from a psycholinguistic point of view; limited space is 
devoted to lexical learning, but it is taken advantage of: Several proposals are 
discussed, including pros and cons of each. Other crucial aspects of language, 
like hierarchy, are mentioned but only in connection to the phonology/prosody 
aspects, for instance, a neurocognitive differentiation between audios of regular 
sentences and backward sentences which suggests structure sensitivity. All 
aspects are related when necessary, for instance, when considering prosody a cue 
for lexical comprehension or rhythm as a determining factor for distinguishing 
different languages even at pre-lexical stages; such relations are clarifying and 
provide unity to the piece. The last part of the article (section 20.5) is devoted to 
the role of memory (recalling events) and its relation to language acquisition 
timing, which apparently makes the former more articulate: Language, it is 
hypothesized, structures event recalling. The section soon enters again the realm 
of phonology and the status of phonological representations (including syllabic 
sensitivity) in the brain of neonates. Relevant references are provided when 
necessary, covering four decades of research, and the discussion is neat and 
reader-friendly.    
 Phonology and the syntax-phonology interface is (also) the subject of 
Chapter 21, by Ewan Dunbar, Brian Dillon & William Idsardi. They focus on the 
phonological points made in Bever’s contribution and Bayesian probabilistic 
models of parsimony in phonological description. Bayesian approaches are 
particularly favorable to Bever’s ‘analysis by synthesis’, insofar as they determine 
that in order to assess the probability of a hypothesis, some prior probability is 
specified, which is then updated given new data, while allowing reasoning under 
uncertainly (as they are not limited by Boolean binary operators). For non-
specialists, it would have been useful that the authors explained what a Bayesian 
probabilistic model is, and, at least briefly, summarize its major points, parti-
cularly given the fact that the whole chapter revolts around mathematical tools 
offered by those models and their use in phonological analyses. In my opinion, a 
couple of sentences in p. 361 are just not enough to fully understand the forth-
coming arguments (even though section 2.3.1 is devoted to probability in linguis-
tics, the basic notions of Bayesian probability are not clearly spelled out). Section 
21.2 is devoted to concrete problems of Kalaallisut phonology, addressed from a 
Bayesian perspective on section 21.3, which also includes more general consider-
ations about the pertinence of Bayesian reasoning in linguistics. The authors 
tackle the issue of acquisition research as one of looking for an optimal gramma-
tical model with respect to primary linguistic data, but the notion of ‘optimality’ 
is not defined or formalized. The article assumes a good deal of mathematical 
knowledge from the reader, but it does provide clarifications for the formulae 
employed, even though some notions (e.g., ‘stochastic model’), with which some 
readers might not be familiar, are not explained. This, nevertheless, does not 
Biolinguistics  «  Reviews  « 160 
undermine the article’s overall intelligibility. When discussing learning algo-
rithms and Bayesian inference (e.g. pp. 368ff.), the authors provide the formula(e) 
in question, which is a very positive feature of this piece, as it entails complete 
explication of the mathematical tools assumed in this particular framework. Pro-
babilistic models are here compared to their possibility to account for a certain 
corpus given so-called Bayes decision rule, in tone with early generative concep-
tions of linguistic theory as providing a decision procedure for grammars (Chomsky 
1957: 52). Despite the highly theoretical character of the piece, and the prolifer-
ation of mathematical formulae (sometimes in detriment of concrete examples), 
the connection to the main topic is never lost, and the application of the 
mathematical framework to phonetics and phonology (and procedures to decide 
between models of acquisition, understood as inference from primary linguistic 
data) is always stressed. 
 The final research piece is, quite appropriately, an article by Thomas Bever, 
who updates and advances considerations made in the initial piece, 43 years 
later. Bever relates his early claims with the subsequent development of the bio-
linguistic program (said to have emerged in 1974), and reviews a series of later 
researched points that stress the relation between language and general cognitive 
and neurological systems. It is worth mentioning those points here, as the reader 
will see they are recurrent topics throughout the book (once again, giving it 
rarely found internal coherence and unity): 
 
(A) Statistical and categorial processes interact, so that initial ‘draft’ represen-
tations of meaning are built, to be replaced with definitive representations 
(cf. chapter 16). 
(B) Sentences mix serial and hierarchical processes (i.e., linearity vs. embed-
ding), and derivations include null terminals (i.e., empty categories). 
(C) Language has modular basis (something apparently ‘logically necessary’, p. 
389), and syntax is computationally unique. 
(D) The neurological basis of language also differ from other skills, perhaps 
being related to lateralization. 
(E) There are some skills involved in language that have parallels in non-
humans, but there remains a core linguistic uniqueness that is only human. 
(F) There are no external sources of linguistic universals (e.g., physical laws). 
 
 The reader might agree or not (I consider, for instance, that the presentation 
of arguments against the view that universals might be given by physical laws 
contains non sequitur arguments, and that the possibility is not seriously con-
sidered), but it is true that the article advances on the introductory chapter, and 
in doing so also provides a historical account of what has happened in between. 
Quite appropriately, Bever presents in section 22.8 two challenges for the future, 
related to the problems of the ‘poverty of stimulus’ (in both acquisition and real-
time comprehension, very much following the line of the ‘analysis by synthesis’ 
approach), and the role of genetic variation (including familiar antecedents) in 
the neurological representation of language. The article follows a neat past–
present–future pattern which makes it a structurally coherent piece, and includes a 
good number of references for each period, including brief discussion of current 
experiments which will surely be reported in forthcoming publications.  
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 The book closes with an Afterword, by Michael Tanenhaus, focused on the 
impact of Bever’s 1970 article, and its offspring: all the debate it generated and all 
the alternative visions of language and cognition it stimulated, some compatible 
with Bever’s formulation, some contrary to it. The Afterword summarizes in a 
very clear manner key points of Bever’s legacy, including its impact on Chomsky-
an generative grammar (unfortunately, without mentioning any alternative 
framework, e.g., Sag & Wasow 2011) and wider aspects of linguistic inquiry, 
often not directly connected with Bever’s ideas, but stemming from the 1970 
paper in one way or another. As a way to project the volume to the future, the 
Afterword features some of the contributors’ impressions about the research 
paths that could arise, flourish, revive, or fall in the future.  
 The volume is overall a very valuable contribution to the fields of neuro-
linguistics, psycholinguistics, theoretical and experimental linguistics, and the 
broader scientific inquiry about the mutual relations between language, 
cognition, and brain, and has the potential to become a classic on the topics. The 
variety of views there expressed, and the focus on interdisciplinary work make 
this book a very important tool for scholars related to any of the aforementioned 
disciplines, or curious about how we got here with respect to learning, proces-
sing, using, and analyzing language. The structure of the book, in terms of 
internal coherence, dynamic organization, and multiple recurrent motifs, is in 
itself a welcomed change with respect to other volumes on the topic. Structure 
and content thus combine to make an excellent state-of-the-art volume, featuring 
some of the most prominent figures on their respective fields, and trying to 
advance the field with cutting-edge research as well as valuable and useful histo-
rical accounts of the development of psycho and neurolinguistics. 
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